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Knick v. Township of Scott: Knick Knack Paddy Whack,
Give the Takings Clause a Bone
I. Introduction
Picture this—you are a recent college graduate with a degree in general
business. You are applying for any and every job opening that you can find. After
four years of pursuing your undergraduate education and spending countless
hours with the school’s career development office working on your resume, you
are finally ready to enter the workforce. However, every application gets rejected
for the same reason—you lack work experience. Each year, numerous college
graduates face this catch-22 while seeking employment. This puzzling hurdle
begs the question: how can one gain work experience when said experience is
often a prerequisite for obtaining employment?
Like the new graduate, American landowners affected by governmental
regulations faced a similar catch-22 scenario until a recent Supreme Court
decision. Specifically, property owners could not bring a federal action
challenging regulatory takings of property and the compensation provided
without first pursuing a state remedy. After seeking the state remedy, however,
the claimant could not challenge the state’s decision, because federal courts
would defer to the state on the matter. Essentially, these plaintiffs asserting Fifth
Amendment claims could only litigate the claims in state court without ever
having the opportunity for a federal court to review that decision. Thankfully, the
Supreme Court recently rejected these arbitrary procedural requirements in Knick
v. Township of Scott. The Knick Court redefined our understanding of the
Takings Clause, which will both eliminate procedural unfairness to property
owners and create new questions concerning the ripeness of Takings claims.
Under the Takings Clause of the Constitution, the government may take
private property for public use, but only if it provides “just compensation” to the
property owner.1 Initially, courts limited governmental takings of property to
those circumstances where the government made a “physical invasion or formal
appropriation of the property.”2 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United
States expanded governmental takings of property in the early twentieth century
to include regulatory takings, in circumstances where “regulation [of private

1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 97-122, TAKINGS DECISIONS
SUPREME COURT: A CHRONOLOGY 11 (2015).
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property] goes too far.”3 Property owners affected by a governmental taking often
have the option of filing an inverse condemnation action in state court where the
claimants seek “to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by
the governmental defendant.”4
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Knick v. Township of Scott, property
owners could not maintain a federal action contesting the governmental taking
without first pursuing a remedy in state court.5 Additionally, federal courts were
required to give “full faith and credit” to the state’s decision, thus precluding
property owners from ever bringing their takings claims in federal court.6 As
such, landowners often found themselves in a catch-22: they lacked standing in
federal court until they received a final state court decision, but a federal court
could never review the state decision.
This Note examines the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Knick and its
unfavorable treatment of previously valid Takings Clause interpretations and
applications.7 Part I of this Note briefly introduces governmental takings and the
processes by which property owners may seek just compensation. Part II explores
the primary decisions that have developed current Takings Clause jurisprudence,
especially those discussed and overruled by the Supreme Court in the Knick v.
Township of Scott opinion. Part III details the specific circumstances and events
that gave rise to the Knick litigation, and Part IV describes and explains the
Supreme Court’s ruling in the case. Part V analyzes the Supreme Court’s unique
interpretation of the Takings Clause and surrounding jurisprudence and the
effects this decision will have on property owners across the nation. Finally, Part
VI discusses conclusions regarding the new interpretation and application of the
Takings Clause and the current climate of state inverse condemnation and federal
takings claims.

3. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“The general rule at least is that
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as
a taking.”).
4. See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (citation omitted).
5. See Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195
(1985) (“[I]f a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property
owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and
been denied just compensation.”), overruled by Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
6. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 347 (2005) (“Whatever the
merits of that concern may be, we are not free to disregard the full faith and credit statute solely to
preserve the availability of a federal forum.”).
7. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
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II. Law Before the Case
A. The Fifth Amendment’s Guarantee of Just Compensation for State and
Federal Takings of Private Property
Although just compensation is a constitutional guarantee for governmental
takings of private property, access to federal courts concerning the matter has not
always been a guarantee for claimants. In fact, federal courts did not have
jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims against the United States until Congress
adopted the Tucker Act in 1887.8 The Tucker Act waived sovereign immunity
and gave jurisdiction to the United States Court of Federal Claims for any claim
“against the United States founded . . . upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress.”9 Specifically, the Tucker Act provided the basis for federal litigation
of takings claims arising out of the Fifth Amendment guarantee for just
compensation. The Supreme Court later described a takings claim as “‘founded
upon the Constitution’ and within the jurisdiction of the [Federal] Court of
Claims to hear and determine.”10
Governmental takings have significantly evolved over time; initially, most
takings occurred in the context of physical appropriations of private land.11
Before 1922, the Court’s Fifth Amendment jurisprudence centered around
physical invasions of property typically associated with “the impacts of
government water projects” like flooding and reduced access.12 However, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon expanded Fifth
Amendment claims to include governmental takings that occur when a regulation
“goes too far.”13 The Court later clarified the standard for when a governmental
regulation acts to take property: instances where the former owner experiences a
loss of title, occupancy, or when the governmental action’s “effects are so
complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject
matter.”14 In the last half-century, Fifth Amendment claims decided by the
Supreme Court have centered around regulatory takings.15 Instead of delving
8. See generally John W. Davis, John Randolph Tucker: The Man and His Work, 6 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 139, 141 (1949).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).
10. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946) (citation omitted).
11. MELTZ, supra note 2, at 1.
12. See id. at 16.
13. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
14. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
15. See MELTZ, supra note 2, at 1 (“The regulatory taking concept . . . underlies many of the
Supreme Court’s takings decisions from the 1970s on.”).
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further into the substantive issues of the Takings Clause, the recent developments
to the amendment’s procedural requirements16 will be the focus of the remainder
of this Note.
B. The State-Litigation Requirement and Preclusion Trap Endured by
Property Owners Asserting Claims of Unjust Compensation for
Governmental Takings
Just as it is reasonable for employers to seek employees with work experience,
the decisions giving rise to the takings procedure paradox seemed logical at the
time. What began with a Tennessee County Planning Commission’s rejection of a
developer’s golf course and residential plat quickly developed into one of the
most counterintuitive procedural requirements of constitutional law.
1. Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank
and the Requirement to Seek Remedy Through State Procedures First
In 1985, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Williamson County Regional
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,17 which initiated the chain of decisions
that created the catch-22 procedure of Takings Clause claims. After the County
Planning Commission rejected the development plans, the new property owner
(who acquired the property through foreclosure) sought compensation in the
United States District for the Middle District of Tennessee.18 The claim asserted
that the commission’s “application of various zoning laws and regulations to [the
developer’s] property amounted to a ‘taking’ of that property.” 19 The jury
eventually awarded the developer “$350,000 as just compensation for the
‘taking,’” which amounted to a denial of the “‘economically viable’ use of [the]
property.”20 While the district court rejected the award through a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the
jury’s verdict on appeal.21 Granting certiorari on the issue of the regulatory
taking, the Supreme Court chose to reverse and remand the Sixth Circuit on
procedural rather than substantive grounds.22
Instead of addressing the petitioners’ claim regarding governmental payment
of money damages to private landowners for temporary takings, the Court
rejected the jury verdict because the respondent had not “utilized the procedures
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See id. at 3–11.
473 U.S. 172 (1985), overruled by Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
Id. at 181–82.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 175, 182.
Id. at 175.
See id. at 175–76, 200.
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Tennessee provides for obtaining just compensation.”23 As such, the Court
concluded, the respondent’s claim was “not ripe” and would not become ripe
“until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations ha[d]
reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the
property at issue.”24
Before Williamson County, the Supreme Court had previously rejected
compensation in takings claims for the lack of ripeness in Agins v. City of
Tiburon25 and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n.26 The
Agins decision substantially relied on the fact that the property owners had not
submitted a plan for development to determine whether the local zoning
ordinance applied to the property.27 Drawing parallels on these facts, the
Williamson County decision is based on the principle that Takings Clause claims
will not be ripe for federal court until the administrative agency decided “how it
will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land.”28 Given this reasonable
justification, it is unfortunate that the Court did not stop there.
In addition to a final determination applying the regulation to the property, the
Court detailed that these owners must also exhaust the available state remedy
procedures (such as inverse condemnation proceedings) before a Takings Clause
claim is ripe for federal court.29 Furthermore, the Court boldly asserted that “no
constitutional violation occurs until just compensation has been denied.”30 Thus,
in one decision, the Supreme Court relegated the Fifth Amendment’s just
compensation protections below those of other federally protected rights.31
Federal courts could not consider these Fifth Amendment claims until a state
court weighed in on the dispute.32 Regardless of the Williamson County opinion’s
opinion’s foundational issues, the actual consequences of the decision are best
understood through the frustrations it has imposed on property owners.

23. Id. at 186.
24. Id.
25. See 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
26. See 452 U.S. 264, 297 (1981).
27. 447 U.S. at 260.
28. Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 191.
29. Id. at 194.
30. Id. at 192 n.13.
31. See Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can’t Get There from Here:
Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-Parody
Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671, 687 (2004) (discussing the exclusion of property owners from the
federal court system when asserting Fifth Amendment claims against governmental agencies).
32. Id.
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2. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco and the
Preclusion Trap
It is clear just how unworkable the Williamson County state-litigation
requirement became in practice when viewed in the context of the Supreme
Court’s decision in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco.33
While the Williamson County Court was content in “hand[ing] authority over
federal takings claims to state courts” solely on the basis of local familiarity with
land-use procedures, it wholly failed to distinguish why similar “challenges to
municipal land-use regulations based on the First Amendment . . . or Equal
Protection Clause” could advance directly to federal court.34 Nevertheless, it was
the San Remo decision that actually shut the federal courthouse doors in the faces
of property owners.
In San Remo, a group of hotel owners brought Fifth Amendment takings
claims in both state and federal court.35 The state court decided against the
property owners, who then requested that the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California “exempt from § 1738’s reach claims brought
under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”36 In essence, the property
owners asserted that the Williamson County state-litigation requirement, in
tandem with the full faith and credit statute, would have a preclusive effect and
wholly prevent federal court access to these Fifth Amendment claims.37 If only
the Supreme Court had as much foresight as the petitioners in San Remo, then
perhaps the Court would have saved itself—and many others—litigation
expenses and headaches. Instead, the Court refused to resolve the consequences
of the conflicting Williamson County doctrine and the full faith and credit
statute.38
The Williamson County Court held that Fifth Amendment claims would not
ripen until property owners were denied compensation at the state level.39 Thus, it
is reasonable to assert that the Court expected property owners to eventually have
standing in federal court. With this Williamson County expectation in mind, it is
difficult to reconcile the San Remo decision, which effectively held that Fifth
33. 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
34. Id. at 350–51 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 326 (majority opinion).
36. Id. at 327.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 347 (“Whatever the merits of [the property owners’] concern may be, we are not
free to disregard the full faith and credit statute solely to preserve the availability of a federal
forum.”).
39. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985),
overruled by Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
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Amendment claims were not just unripe, but more accurately improper for federal
federal court.40 The full faith and credit statute “provides that ‘judicial
proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in
the courts of such State.’”41 By solely reviewing the historical background and
foundation for the statute, the Court refused to consider the very dilemma it
created in Williamson County and left Fifth Amendment claims to die in state
court, caught in the clutches of the preclusion trap.42
As a preview of what would come, Chief Justice Rehnquist, by way of his
concurrence, articulated that the “justifications for [the] state-litigation
requirement are suspect.”43 Furthermore, he believed “the Court should
reconsider whether plaintiffs asserting a Fifth Amendment takings claim based on
on the final decision of a state or local government entity must first seek
compensation in state courts.”44 It would ultimately be another thirty-four years
until the Court accurately addressed and resolved the state-litigation requirement
and preclusion trap preventing federal courts from having jurisdiction to hear
Fifth Amendment claims.
C. Consequences of the Combined Doctrines: Lack of Federal Court Access
to Plaintiffs and Gamesmanship by Defendants
In the years after San Remo, property owners continued to pursue just
compensation for governmental takings of private property in state courts.
Ironically, the government defendants—like those in San Remo and Williamson
County who had sought to avoid federal court jurisdiction over takings claims45—
claims45—began to remove takings cases to federal courts.46 The government
defendants in City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, for

40. See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 347 (“‘[A] claim that the application of government regulations
effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with
implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the
regulations to the property at issue,’ consequently, there is scant precedent for the litigation in
federal district court of claims that a state agency has taken property in violation of the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause.” (quoting Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 186)).
41. Id. at 336 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1738).
42. See id. at 338 (“Federal courts . . . are not free to disregard [the full faith and credit statute]
simply to guarantee that all takings plaintiffs can have their day in federal court.”).
43. Id. at 352 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
44. Id.
45. See id. at 326 (majority opinion); see also Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 185 (1985), overruled by Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162
(2019).
46. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 161 (1997).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

802

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:795

example, removed a just compensation claim (alleging both federal and state
constitutional violations) to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction.47
The Supreme Court granted review to consider the jurisdictional issue.48
Specifically, the Court contemplated whether a defendant could remove a case
when it contains both: (1) claims for federal law violations by state agencies and
(2) “state law claims for on-the-record review of the administrative findings.”49
Placing the question in the context of supplemental and federal question
jurisdiction, the Court determined that the federal district court could indeed
exercise jurisdiction over the claims.50
While the answers to the jurisdictional questions in City of Chicago are not
called into question here, the resulting consequences are indicative of yet another
layer of disparity and hardships imposed on takings claimants. Because of
Williamson County, plaintiffs could not initiate a lawsuit asserting Fifth
Amendment takings claims in federal court. However, after City of Chicago,
defendants could remove these same claims to federal court and get them
dismissed for lack of ripeness or exhaustion of state remedies.51
In Warner v. City of Marathon, plaintiffs initiated, inter alia, a takings action
in Florida state court.52 Immediately, the defendants removed the case to federal
court and argued that the state law claim arose under a federal question—the
Fifth Amendment.53 Thereafter, the government defendants sought to dismiss the
takings claim on the ground that it was unripe, according to Williamson County’s
exhaustion of state remedies requirement.54 The district court agreed with the
defendants and granted the dismissal; the plaintiff appealed the decision to the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.55 Correctly applying Williamson County, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision because a Florida court had
not denied the plaintiff just compensation.56 So, even though the plaintiff initially
filed the inverse condemnation claim in state court as required by Williamson
47. Id.
48. Id. at 163.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 174. The Court further elaborated that ICS’s complaint alleged violations of the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause, which a federal court would have original jurisdiction over. Moreover,
the state-law claims regarding the administrative procedures could be properly considered by the
federal court through supplemental jurisdiction. Id. at 164–65.
51. See Warner v. City of Marathon, 718 F. App’x 834, 840 (11th Cir. 2017) (determining
that plaintiffs’ claims were not yet ripe for review).
52. Id. at 836.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 837.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 838.
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County, the defendants could remove the action and immediately dismiss the suit
for lack of a state court denial. Warner encapsulates the gamesmanship and
paradoxical effects Williamson County left on takings claimants.
Although the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s takings
claims, other courts have begun to recognize the bad-faith nature of such actions
by defendants.57 For example, the Sixth Circuit recently affirmed a district court’s
denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss following the removal of a takings
action to the district court.58 Playing the same game as the Warner defendants,
the Township of Pennfield sought dismissal for lack of ripeness.59 Even so, the
district court denied the motion and awarded attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs
because the defendants “lacked an objectively reasonable basis for removal”
the federal court clearly lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim.60 Even though the
Sixth Circuit’s ruling provided takings claimants some relief in that circuit, it did
not resolve the many challenges faced by property owners in the other circuit
courts. Furthermore, the procedural hurdles remained, preventing takings
plaintiffs from filing their Fifth Amendment claims in federal courts.
III. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
The case that redefined the Fifth Amendment’s protections—Knick v.
Township of Scott—all started with an eighty-five-year-old man’s genealogy
research.61 Robert Vail, Sr., a resident of the Township of Scott, Pennsylvania
(“the township”), “believed [his] ancestors were buried” on his neighbor’s
property after conducting a genealogy study.62 Unfortunately for Vail, his
neighbor, Rose Mary Knick, did not welcome the idea of people roaming around
her ninety-acre rural property.63 Accordingly, Knick, who had lived on the
57. See, e.g., A Forever Recovery, Inc. v. Twp. of Pennfield, 606 F. App’x 279, 283–84 (6th
Cir. 2015) (concluding that the district court did not err in determining that defendant removed the
case in bad faith); Yamagiwa v. City of Half Moon Bay, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1110 (N.D. Cal.
2007) (concluding that defendants’ efforts to seek remand back to state court after removing the
action to federal court “smacks of bad faith”).
58. Forever Recovery, 606 F. App’x at 283–84.
59. Id. at 282.
60. Id. at 281.
61. See Jessica Gresko, Cemetery Case Puts Property Rights Issue Before High Court, AP
NEWS (Oct. 4, 2018), http://apnews.com/86ec9d89d4d34579b528845f5f8c1642.
62. Jason Nark, N.E. Pennsylvania Woman Wins U.S. Supreme Court Case to Keep Grave
Seekers off Her Land, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 21, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/
court-scotus-pennsylvania-property-constitution-20190621.html; Gresko, supra note 61.
63. See Gresko, supra note 61.
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property since 1970, hired an attorney to help her look for records or physical
landmarks on the property that would indicate the presence of an ancient burial
site.64 When they could not find any indications of such a graveyard, Knick even
“invited township officials to [find] the supposed burial site.”65 Even so, the
officials declined the offer at the time.66 Vail, who wanted to visit the cemetery
and plant flags commemorating his ancestors’ gravestones, requested help from
the township.67
In 2012, the township adopted an ordinance requiring that “[a]ll cemeteries . . .
shall be kept open and accessible to the general public during daylight hours.”68 A
violation of the ordinance subjected the property owner to a fine between $300
and $600, and “[e]ach day that the violation exist[ed] . . . constitut[ed] a separate
offense.”69 Furthermore, the ordinance’s definition of a “cemetery” clearly
encompassed the alleged graveyard on Knick’s private land.70 Pursuant to the
township’s ordinance, a code enforcement officer visited the property and “found
several grave markers on Knick’s property.”71 The officer then notified Knick that
that she was violating the ordinance for failure to keep the property open to the
public during the day.72
B. Procedural History and Issue
Upon receipt of the citation, Knick challenged the alleged regulatory taking of
her property in state court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.73 Instead of
pursuing an inverse condemnation action, however, Knick asked the Lackawanna
County Court of Common Pleas to declare the ordinance unconstitutional in
violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.74 The township then agreed

64. Rose Mary Knick, Your View by Pa. Woman Who Won Supreme Court Case: It’s My
Farm but It’s Everybody’s Constitution, MORNING CALL (July 14, 2019, 11:00 AM),
https://www.mcall.com/opinion/mc-opi-knick-versus-scott-township-20190714-vqvtfex25
rev5adtvf2xtplu3u-story.html.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Gresko, supra note 61.
68. Scott Township, Lackawanna County, Pa., Ordinance No. 12-12-20-001 § 5 (2012).
69. Id. § 7.
70. See id. § 1(c) (defining “cemetery” as “[a] place or area of ground, whether contained on
private or public property, which has been set apart for or otherwise utilized as a burial ground for
deceased human beings”).
71. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2168 (2019).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, No. 3:14-CV-02223, 2016 WL 4701549, at *2 (M.D. Pa.
Sept. 8, 2016) (providing the procedural history of Knick’s state court action).
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to stay enforcement of the ordinance during the pendency of the lawsuit.75
Ironically, the lack of an ongoing enforcement action forced the state court to
dismiss Knick’s request for relief, because she could no longer “demonstrate the
irreparable harm necessary” to enjoin the ordinance.76
Upon dismissal of the state court action, Knick initiated another proceeding in
federal district court, maintaining her belief that the ordinance violated the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause.77 Applying the Williamson County exhaustion
requirement, the district court dismissed Knick’s lawsuit because she had not
exhausted her remedies at state law through an inverse condemnation action.78
Then, Knick appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
district court’s dismissal and application of Williamson County.79
IV. Decision
A. The Majority Opinion
To preface the discussion of the competing views advanced by the parties, the
underlying discourse in Knick centers on when a Takings Clause violation has
occurred. Initially, the Supreme Court began its analysis by looking at the central
cases that shaped the current understanding and application of the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause.80 First, the Court discussed Williamson County’s
ripeness requirements of exhaustion both at the administrative level (applying the
regulation to the property) and through the state’s just compensation (inverse
condemnation) cause of action.81 Because Knick did not challenge the first
exhaustion requirement, the Court then quickly dove into discussing the purpose,
context, and merits of the state just compensation requirement.82
First, the Court considered the significant and “unanticipated consequences”
that Williamson County would eventually have on property owners affected by

75. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Knick, 2016 WL 4701549, at *5–6.
79. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 862 F.3d 310, 326 (3d Cir. 2017).
80. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2169–72.
81. Id. at 2169.
82. See id. (“According to the Court, ‘if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking
just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the [Takings] Clause until it has
used the procedure and been denied just compensation.’” (quoting Williamson Cnty. Reg’l
Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985), overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. at
2179)).
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governmental takings.83 Enter San Remo and the preclusion trap. Digging into the
San Remo opinion, the Court recited the facts: a group of takings plaintiffs
“complied with Williamson County and brought a claim for compensation in
state court.”84 Yet, the plaintiffs only sought relief under the state constitution
takings clause, while hoping to retain “their Fifth Amendment claim for a later
federal suit if the state suit proved unsuccessful.”85 Unfortunately for the San
Remo plaintiffs, the lower courts held—and the Supreme Court affirmed—“the
full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, required the federal court to give
preclusive effect to the state court’s decision.”86 While Williamson County
required a state proceeding and determination to give “rise to a ripe federal
takings claim,” San Remo “simultaneously barred that claim” and wholly
“prevent[ed] the federal court from ever considering it.”87 Hence, the aptly coined
phrase, preclusion trap, refers to the no-win situation that these decisions
imposed on takings claimants.
Importantly, the Knick Court understood the detriments that these two
decisions imposed on property owners. Specifically, the Knick majority
articulated that the state just compensation requirement “relegates the Takings
Clause ‘to the status of a poor relation’ among the provisions of the Bill of
Rights.”88 While other constitutional claims are guaranteed federal court access,
“the state-litigation requirement ‘hand[s] authority over federal takings claims to
state courts.’”89 Before the Court further reasoned its disfavor of Williamson
County, it stated the more appropriate interpretation of the Fifth Amendment.
Takings Clause, per the Court, confers a property owner with a claim of violation
“as soon as a government takes his property for public use without paying for
it.”90 This understanding of the clause enables property owners to bring takings
claims in federal court without enduring a state inverse condemnation action.91
With this clear predictor of the Court’s outcome, the majority opinion retraced
its steps to illustrate how it developed this refined Takings Clause interpretation

83. See id. (“The unanticipated consequences of this ruling were not clear until 20 years later,
when this Court decided San Remo.”).
84. Id. (citing San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 331 (2005)).
85. Id. (citing San Remo, 545 U.S. at 331–32).
86. Id. (citing San Remo, 545 U.S. at 347).
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994)).
89. Id. at 2170 (quoting San Remo, 545 U.S. at 350 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)).
90. Id.
91. See id. (“If a local government takes private property without paying for it, that
government has violated the Fifth Amendment—just as the Takings Clause says—without regard to
subsequent state court proceedings.”).
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and application.92 Knick takes us back to Williamson County, its predecessors,
and its progeny. The Williamson County Court believed a governmental taking
gave property owners “a right to a state law procedure that [would] eventually
result in just compensation.”93
Part of the Williamson County Court’s understanding of the Takings Clause
derived from Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., where a plaintiff sought injunctive
relief against a federal statute that effected a taking.94 In Ruckelshaus, though,
“the statute set up a special arbitration procedure for obtaining compensation,”
and the plaintiff retained the right to assert a Tucker Act claim if arbitration
proved unsuccessful.95 In rejecting the claim, the Knick Court noted that
“[e]quitable relief is not available to enjoin” a governmental taking of property
“when a suit for compensation” is available after the taking occurred.96 When
monetary relief is still available, equitable relief will not be available, which,
according to Knick, is “consistent with [the Court’s] precedent.”97
Even still, the Ruckelshaus Court further elaborated that if the plaintiff
obtained any compensation through arbitration, then “no taking has occurred and
the [plaintiff] has no claim against the Government.”98 Once endorsed by
Williamson County, this view greatly exceeded reasonable constitutional
interpretation and construction. Notably, the Williamson County Court believed
that “[i]f the government has provided an adequate process for obtaining
compensation, and if resort to that process ‘yield[s] just compensation,’ then the
property owner ‘has no claim against the Government’ for a taking.”99
According to Knick, this view is fundamentally wrong in two respects. First,
Williamson County correctly stated that a justly compensated plaintiff no longer
has a claim, but this claim evaporates “not because there was no taking in the
first place.”100 Instead, the plaintiff no longer retains a claim “because the taking
has been remedied by compensation.”101 Second, the Williamson County Court
incorrectly believed that “taking[s] claims against the Federal Government are

92. See id. at 2170–78.
93. Id. at 2171 (citing Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 195 (1985), overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2179).
94. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 998–99 (1984).
95. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2173 (citing Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1018).
96. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1016.
97. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2173.
98. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1018 n.21.
99. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985),
overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2179 (quoting Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1013, 1018 n.21).
100. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2173.
101. Id.
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premature until the property owner” has endured the Tucker Act’s processes.102
The Knick majority distinctly disagreed, advancing the notion that a just
compensation claim “brought under the Tucker Act is not a prerequisite to a Fifth
Amendment takings claim—it is a Fifth Amendment takings claim.”103 The Knick
Knick Court supported this contention by noting that “[a] party who loses a
Tucker Act suit has nowhere else to go to seek compensation for an alleged
taking.”104 Accordingly, the Tucker Act, by itself, is not a claim that a plaintiff
must pursue before a takings claim may be advanced. Instead, it is merely the
vehicle utilized to assert a takings claim in federal court.
According to the Knick majority, the Williamson County Court also
mischaracterized much of the Supreme Court’s Takings Clause precedent—most
notably Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co.105 Chief Justice
Roberts’s majority opinion directly addressed Cherokee Nation and its progeny.
It highlighted that each takings claim dealt with requests for injunctive relief,
which is distinguishable from demands for compensation.106 Specifically, the
Chief Justice expressed: just “because the property owner was not entitled to
injunctive relief at the time of the taking does not mean there was no violation of
the Takings Clause at that time.”107
After an extensive historical analysis, the Chief Justice emphasized that
Takings Clause jurisprudence has traditionally held that injunctive relief will be
denied so long as “property owners ha[ve] an adequate remedy at law.”108 This
tradition suggests that the availability of the just compensation procedure does
not itself prevent a constitutional violation from happening.109 Instead, the
process for obtaining just compensation is actually the remedy for such a
constitutional violation.110 Ultimately, the Knick Court’s renewed view and
redefined interpretation of the Takings Clause directly contrasts the Williamson
County decision. As such, the Court then turned to address “whether stare

102. Id. at 2174 (quoting Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 195).
103. Id. at 2174.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 2175 (“The Court in Williamson County relied on statements in our prior
opinions that the Clause ‘does not provide or require that compensation shall be actually paid in
advance of the occupancy of the land to be taken.’” (quoting Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co.,
135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2176 (citing Stetson v. Chicago & Evanston R.R. Co., 75 Ill. 74, 78 (1874)).
109. See id. at 2177.
110. See id. at 2176–77.
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decisis counsel[ed] in favor of adhering to the [Williamson County] decision,
despite its error.”111
Considering whether to overrule Williamson County, the Court first
emphasized how maintaining a settled rule of law is generally more important
than having the rule of law settled correctly.112 Because stare decisis is at its
weakest when referring to constitutional interpretation, the Court began by
weighing the competing interests and impact of overturning precedent.113 After a
thorough analysis criticizing the quality of the Williamson County reasoning and
the workability of the state-litigation rule, the Knick Court held that the 1985
decision did not deserve application of the doctrine of stare decisis.114
Accordingly, a landowner may challenge an uncompensated governmental taking
of property in federal court.115 Vacating the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court allowed Rose Mary Knick to continue pursuing compensation for
the regulatory taking of the alleged graveyard on her property.116 Additionally,
after thirty years of frustrating property owners affected by governmental takings,
Knick finally abandoned the impracticality of Williamson County.
B. Justice Kagan’s Dissent
Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, Justice Kagan wrote
fearfully of the majority’s refusal to adhere to stare decisis.117 Indeed, the
dissenting justices voiced these concerns quite clearly, noting the majority’s
holding “conflict[s] with precedent after precedent.”118 Notably, the dissent
criticizes the Knick holding on three grounds: (1) it will cause innocent
governmental actors to frequently commit constitutional violations, (2) the
courts will overflow with claims that turn on the intricacies of state law, and (3)
the decision encourages the rejection of stare decisis.119

111. Id. at 2177.
112. Id. (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997)).
113. Id.; see also Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235 (“[Stare decisis] is at its weakest when we interpret
the Constitution because our interpretation can be altered only by constitutional amendment or by
overruling our prior decisions.”).
114. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2178–79.
115. Id. at 2179.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 2181 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. See id. at 2181, 2187 (lamenting that the majority’s decision “transgresses all usual
principles of stare decisis,” will “turn even well-meaning government officials into lawbreakers,”
and “subvert[s] important principles of judicial federalism”).
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The dissent criticized the majority’s rejection of both Williamson County and
the Court’s historical understanding of the Fifth Amendment’s protections.120 In
addition to its concerns for precedent, the dissent starkly disagreed with the
Court’s renewed view of the protections that the Takings Clause affords.121 In
fact, Justice Kagan believed the Knick decision held “that a government violates
the Constitution whenever it takes property without advance compensation—no
matter how good its commitment to pay.”122 But the Justice failed to elaborate on
what commitment the municipal government had made to compensate property
owners like Knick.
Nevertheless, Justice Thomas’s concurrence aptly described the commitment:
“the government ‘implicitly promises to pay compensation for any taking’ if a
property owner successfully sues the government in court.”123 The concurring
Justice further noted, “The Fifth Amendment does not merely provide a damages
remedy to a property owner willing to shoulder the burden of securing
compensation after the government takes property without paying for it.”124 As
such, Justice Thomas expressly and adequately addressed the concerns articulated
articulated by the dissenting justices.
V. Analysis
The Knick decision has already left incredible consequences on Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence ranging from ensuring federal court access for takings
plaintiffs to preventing gamesmanship by government defendants. Before
addressing the effects of the decision, Justice Kagan’s dissenting views are
particularly noteworthy, even to those without a stake in the development of
property rights. The dissent raised two critical warnings about the majority’s
decision. First, and perhaps most clearly, it warned about two primary
ramifications the Knick decision will have on the Court’s Takings Clause
jurisprudence.125 Second, Justice Kagan expressed concerns for the majority’s

120. Id. at 2180. But see id. at 2177 (majority opinion) (“But under today’s decision every one
of the cases cited by the dissent would come out the same way—the plaintiffs would not be entitled
to the relief they requested because they could instead pursue a suit for compensation.”).
121. See id. at 2181–83 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 2181 (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 2180 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Supplemental Letter Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae 5).
124. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
125. See id. at 2187 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[The majority’s decision] will have two damaging
consequences. It will inevitably turn even well-meaning government officials into lawbreakers. And
it will subvert important principles of judicial federalism.”).
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willingness to overturn the Williamson County precedent, which she believed
foreshadowed more rejection of stare decisis in the future.126
As noted above, the dissent argued that the Court’s decision would
detrimentally affect takings disputes in two primary ways. First, Justice Kagan
believed the decision would transform innocent governmental employees into
constitutional violators.127 Moreover, she argued the new rule subjected highly
localized state property law to federal courts.128 Because these contentions are
without merit, Justice Kagan’s concerns for the rejection of stare decisis are
exaggerated.
At first glance, the dissent’s concern for innocent government employees
seems to be valid, because everyday takings would become constitutional
violations. Yet, Justice Thomas, once again, shed light on these misplaced fears.
If the Court’s decision “makes some regulatory programs ‘unworkable in
practice,’ so be it—[the Court’s] role is to enforce the Takings Clause as
written.”129 As one commenter noted, Justice Kagan’s argument seeks to allow
“[l]ocal governments [to] run afoul of the [T]akings [C]lause precisely because
they so routinely deprive people of their constitutional rights.”130 Allowing
government officials to continue such a practice only out of convenience rather
than “compensating property owners . . . is irrational.”131 Further, the majority’s
decision does not affect the constitutional validity of these governmental actors’
choices. The program in question does not violate the Constitution unless it
concerns a taking of private property without just compensation—which is
identical to the prior treatment of programs in state courts.132

126. Id. at 2190 (noting that Justice Breyer had wondered when the majority would overrule
another case and offering, “[W]ell that didn’t take long. Now one may wonder yet again.”).
127. Id. at 2187 (“[The majority’s decision] will inevitably turn even well-meaning government
officials into lawbreakers.”).
128. Id. (“[T]he majority’s ruling channels to federal courts a (potentially massive) set of cases
that more properly belongs . . . in state courts . . . .”).
129. Id. at 2180 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Supplemental Letter Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae 5).
130. Timothy Sandefur, The Supreme Court Rights a Property-Rights Wrong, GOLDWATER
INST. (June 21, 2019), https://indefenseofliberty.blog/2019/06/21/the-supreme-court-rights-aproperty-rights-wrong/.
131. Id.
132. See Ilya Somin, Supreme Court Overrules Precedent That Created “Catch-22” for
Property Owners Attempting to Bring Takings Cases in Federal Court, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(June 21, 2019, 12:04 PM), https://reason.com/2019/06/21/supreme-court-overrules-precedentthat-created-catch-22-for-property-owners-attempting-to-bring-takings-cases-in-federal-court/
(“Exactly the same thing happens when the regulatory program in question is challenged in state
court, and the latter rules that it was a taking.”).
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Next, the dissent voiced concerns about allowing federal judges to decide the
intricacies of state law,133 but this argument is also flawed. The Court does not
similarly deny federal court access to any other constitutional protection simply
because state officials might be more familiar with the details of the state laws.134
Further, Justice Kagan’s theory overlooks a key factor. State officials’ intimate
knowledge of state law does not give them any additional advantage “in property
rights cases than they have in other constitutional cases where the outcome may
depend on interpretations of state law.”135 As such, Justice Kagan’s concern for
federal judges considering state-specific property laws is unsupported by other
areas of constitutional jurisprudence.
Ultimately, the dissent, arguing for stare decisis, simply chose the “wrong hill
to die on.”136 Whatever justifications stare decisis holds for adherence to
precedent, Williamson County strikes against the most fundamental protections
of the Fifth Amendment. The state litigation requirement, though undisturbed for
thirty years, proved to be neither supported by Takings Clause jurisprudence nor
workable in practice.137 Justice Kagan voiced concerns for “reversing legal
course” when a later Court determines an earlier ruling to be incorrect.138 These
concerns, however, overstate the Court’s rejection of precedent in Knick.
Williamson County demonstrated more than an incorrect interpretation of the
Fifth Amendment: it almost wholly barred the Amendment’s protection of
property owners affected by regulatory takings.
The Knick decision is best understood with these dissenting views in mind.
First and foremost, Knick disposed of Williamson County’s state litigation
requirement for takings claims.139 Implicit in Knick’s overruling of Williamson
County is the disposal of the San Remo preclusion trap. Nevertheless, ripeness
still requires Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claims to obtain a final

133. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2188–89.
134. Ilya Somin, Knick v. Township of Scott: Ending a Catch-22 That Barred Takings Cases
From Federal Court, 2018-2019 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 153, 164–65 (comparing federal court
considerations of the Fifth Amendment with those of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment).
135. Id. at 165.
136. Robert H. Thomas, Knick Analysis, Part IV: Why Not Let Sleeping Dogs Lie? The Dissent
and Stare Decisis, INVERSECONDEMNATION.COM (June 24, 2019), https://www.inverse
condemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2019/06/knick-analysis-part-iv.html (criticizing Justice
Kagan’s description of Fifth Amendment rights after Williamson County).
137. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2178 (“[Williamson County’s] reasoning was exceptionally ill founded
founded and conflicted with much of our takings jurisprudence.”). See also supra Section II.C.
138. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2190 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 2177 (majority opinion).
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administrative decision before a federal court may have standing.140 That aspect
of Williamson County remains valid law.
Obviously, Knick has opened the federal courthouse doors to takings claims.
Yet, the decision does not require these claimants to litigate in federal court.
Property owners still have the option to pursue their claims in state court, so
Knick will inevitably lead to some forum shopping on the part of property owners
affected by far-reaching regulations. The property owners who assert their claims
in state court, however, will likely be unable to bring a later federal lawsuit of the
same nature.141 Additionally, if the litigation began in state court, then
government defendants would have the option to remove the Fifth Amendment
claim to federal court. Whereas before Knick, this removal would lead to a
subsequent dismissal for failure to finalize state litigation,142 government
defendants will no longer be able to play the removal-and-dismiss game.
Going forward, property owners wishing to litigate their takings claims in
federal court should assert a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action seeking just
compensation as the remedy. As noted by the Ruckelshaus discussion in the
Knick opinion, property owners may not enjoin a regulatory taking in federal
court unless compensation is unavailable.143 What remains unclear is whether a
state inverse condemnation claim has standing in federal court for arising under
federal law.144
VI. Conclusion
Unfortunately for many recent graduates, the Knick decision did not resolve
the challenge resulting from their lack of work experience. Knick, however, ended
140. See id. (disposing only of the state-litigation requirement).
141. Despite discussing the detrimental effects San Remo and Williamson County had on
property owners, the Court only overruled Williamson County’s state-litigation requirement. Id. at
2179 (“But, as we held in San Remo, the state court’s resolution of the plaintiff's inverse
condemnation claim has preclusive effect in any subsequent federal suit.”). Accordingly, San Remo
still applies when property owners are denied relief in state courts—federal courts will have to give
the state decision “full faith and credit.” See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S.
323, 347 (2005) (“[W]e are not free to disregard the full faith and credit statute solely to preserve
the availability of a federal forum.”).
142. See, e.g., Warner v. City of Marathon, 718 F. App’x 834, 840 (11th Cir. 2017)
(determining, after defendant removed the case to federal court, that plaintiffs’ claims were not yet
ripe for review).
143. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2173.
144. Id. at 2174 n.5 (“[The Solicitor General argued] that state inverse condemnation claims
‘aris[e] under’ federal law and can be brought in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 through the
Grable doctrine.”). The Court did not address the Solicitor General’s argument because it
determined that a federal takings claim may be brought immediately through § 1983. Id.
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ended the doctrinal paradox that has frustrated landowners for over thirty years.
Ultimately, this decision is a meaningful procedural win for property owners, but
the substantive merits of Rose Mary Knick’s claim remain unchanged. In the end,
end, Knick imparts only one change to Takings Clause jurisprudence: property
owners challenging regulatory takings no longer have to rely on state courts as
their sole tribunal. The Knick Court abolished a detrimental, contradictory
standard that prevented federal courts from ever resolving these constitutional
claims. While we may never know if a graveyard remains on Rose Mary Knick’s
property, one thing is clear—Williamson County’s state-litigation requirement
has finally been laid to rest.
Gatlin Squires
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